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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Get the Balance Right: The Supreme Court’s
Lopsided Balancing Test for Evaluating State Voter-Identiﬁcation Laws;
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
!ARON * ,YTTLE

INTRODUCTION
In 2000 and 2004, the United States experienced two divisive presidential
elections giving rise to accusations of widespread voting irregularities.1 According
to many commentators, these elections highlighted the problem of voter fraud.2
A number of states responded by passing statutes requiring voters to present
identiﬁcation prior to voting.3 Many critics allege Republican legislatures pass such
laws to suppress turnout by groups more likely to vote for Democratic candidates.4
Others argue voter-identiﬁcation laws prevent fraud and ensure the integrity of
the electoral process.5 The Indiana legislature passed one such act: Senate Enrolled
Act 483 (“SEA 483”).6 It requires citizens who vote in person on election day, or
who cast a ballot in person at an ofﬁce of the circuit court clerk before election
day, to present a form of government-issued photo-identiﬁcation.7 Voters without

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2010. I thank my wife, Abby, and my family
for their love and support. I thank Lisa Rich for her advice and guidance. I also thank my friends
and coaches from the Cheyenne East High School, University of Pittsburgh, and University of
Wyoming debate teams.
1
See David Schultz, ,ESS 4HAN &UNDAMENTAL 4HE -YTH OF 6OTER &RAUD AND THE #OMING OF THE
3ECOND 'REAT $ISENFRANCHISEMENT, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 493 (2008) (identifying widespread
claims of voter intimidation and fraud in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections).
2
Linda Greenhouse, *USTICES !GREE TO (EAR #ASE #HALLENGING 6OTER )$ ,AWS, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 2007, at A24 (describing the Republican push for voter-identiﬁcation laws following the 2000
election); Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, 6OTER &RAUD #OMPLAINTS BY '/0 $ROVE $ISMISSALS, WASH.
POST, May 14, 2007, at A04 (describing a massive Department of Justice effort to uncover evidence
of voter fraud).

$EVELOPMENTS IN THE ,AW—Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1144 (2006)
[hereinafter $EVELOPMENTS IN THE ,AW].
3

4

John B. Judis, #AN THE '/0 #ONVINCE "LACKS .OT TO 6OTE?, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 2002, at

12.
5

See, e.g., United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, 0UTTING AN %ND TO 6OTER &RAUD
(Feb. 15, 2005), http://rpc.senate.gov/_ﬁles/feb1504Voterfraudsd.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2008)
(pointing to a plague of fraud).
6

IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1 (West Supp. 2007).

7

Id.
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identiﬁcation may cast provisional ballots if they bring identiﬁcation to the circuit
court clerk’s ofﬁce within ten days of casting their ballots.8
The Indiana Democratic Party sued Indiana state ofﬁcials in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, arguing SEA 483
unduly burdened First and Fourteenth Amendment voting rights.9 The district
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ﬁnding SEA 483 a
reasonable regulation that did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments.10
According to the court, Indiana had a sufﬁciently important regulatory interest in
combating voter fraud to justify SEA 483’s reasonable burden.11 A divided panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit afﬁrmed the district
court’s judgment.12 Judge Posner, writing for the majority, held SEA 483 did not
unduly burden voting rights.13 According to the court, SEA 483 did not prevent
any plaintiffs from voting.14 The court refused to apply strict scrutiny because
it found the state had an interest in preventing fraud, which dilutes legitimate
votes.15 Accordingly, a majority held SEA 483 constituted a reasonable electoral
regulation, justiﬁed by Indiana’s interest in preventing fraud.16
In #RAWFORD V -ARION #OUNTY %LECTION "OARD (#RAWFORD ))), the United States
Supreme Court afﬁrmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision, holding SEA 483 could
withstand a facial challenge.17 Although the Court issued no majority opinion,

8
Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b) (West 2006). Voters who establish their residence and identity may
receive free photo-identiﬁcation from the Department of Motor Vehicles. Id. § 9-24-16-10(b)
(West Supp. 2007). SEA 483 exempts persons who submit absentee ballots by mail or who live in
state licensed facilities like nursing homes. Id. § 3-11-8-25.1(e) (West Supp. 2007).
9

Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff ’d sub nom.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. (#RAWFORD )), 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007), aff ’d,
128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
10

Id. at 845.

11

Id. at 826.

12

#RAWFORD ), 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007), aff ’g 2OKITA, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind.
2006). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit consolidated the Democratic Party’s suit with a similar
suit brought by William Crawford and other parties. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd.
(#RAWFORD ))), 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008). Indiana intervened to defend SEA 483. Id.
13

#RAWFORD ), 472 F.3d at 954.

14

Id. at 951–52.

15

Id. at 952.

16

Id. at 954.

17

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1624. In contrast to challenging the constitutionality of a law’s
application, a facial challenge must demonstrate “no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also Michael C. Dorf,
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 239–40 (1994) (describing the
Rehnquist Court’s harsh facial/as-applied division). Plaintiffs often challenge election laws facially
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a six Justice plurality found SEA 483 protected the electoral process and did
not unduly burden voting rights.18 Applying the sliding-scale test articulated in
"URDICK V 4AKUSHI, the Court found SEA 483 did not excessively burden any class
of voters’ rights.19 Consequently, it refused to apply strict scrutiny and held the
state’s interest in securing electoral integrity gave Indiana’s voter-identiﬁcation law
a plainly legitimate sweep, overcoming the petitioners’ facial challenge.20
This note examines the United States Supreme Court’s attempt to resolve
confusion when evaluating the constitutionality of state voter-identiﬁcation laws.
First, it examines the legal background of voter-identiﬁcation laws.21 Next, it
explains the Court’s split decision in #RAWFORD V -ARION #OUNTY %LECTION "OARD
(#RAWFORD ))).22 Then, it argues the Court adopted a lopsided balancing test,
placing greater emphasis on states’ interests in preventing fraud than on the risk
of burdening voting rights.23 Although as-applied challenges showing concrete
evidence of disenfranchisement may succeed, the Court’s failure to weigh voters’
interests against those of the state leaves the prior confusion untouched, thus
endangering voting rights.24 Next, this note proposes that courts should move
away from rigid tiers of scrutiny and facially evaluate voter-identiﬁcation laws,
applying "URDICK in a balanced and ﬂexible manner.25 Finally, this note presents
suggestions for practitioners and legislators.26

because of the difﬁculty of remedying past elections. L. Paige Whitaker, The Constitutionality
OF 2EQUIRING 0HOTO )DENTIlCATION FOR 6OTING !N !NALYSIS OF Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, CRS REPORTS FOR CONGRESS, May 19, 2008, at CRS-2 n.4, available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/106161.pdf.
18
#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1634; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Crawford )T #OULD (AVE "EEN 7ORSE,
Election Law @ Moritz, Apr. 29, 2008, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/commentary/articles.
php?ID=411 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008) (describing #RAWFORD ))S divided result). Justice Stevens
announced the Court’s judgment, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. #RAWFORD
II, 128 S. Ct. at 1612. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and
Alito. Id. Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id. Justice Breyer ﬁled a separate
dissent. Id.
19

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1622–23; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)
(weighing a state ballot access restriction’s burden on voting rights against the state’s interest in that
restriction); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (using a balancing test to evaluate
state electoral regulations).
20

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1623.

21

See infra notes 27–97 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 98–142 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 143–76 and accompanying text.

24

Id.

25

See infra notes 179–92 and accompanying text.

26

See infra notes 193–200 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND
This section begins with a discussion of the legal background underlying
#RAWFORD V -ARION #OUNTY %LECTION "OARD (#RAWFORD ))).27 First, it discusses the
United States Supreme Court’s pre-#RAWFORD )) voting rights jurisprudence,
including the situations where it limited state election regulations to protect those
rights.28 It then examines statutes requiring voters to show identiﬁcation and
closes with a review of how lower federal courts have reacted to constitutional
challenges to those laws.29

6OTING 2IGHTS *URISPRUDENCE
The United States Constitution gives state governments authority to determine
the “times, places, and manner” of holding elections.30 Federal courts grant
states signiﬁcant latitude in carrying out that role to maintain fair and efﬁcient
elections.31 For much of United States history, the federal judiciary avoided
getting involved in electoral disputes, deferring to states’ interests.32 Although the
Constitution provides no explicit right to vote, the United States Supreme Court
has found a fundamental right to vote implicit in the First Amendment of the Bill
of Rights.33 In spite of deference to state regulations, in most circumstances, states

27

See infra notes 30–97 and accompanying text.

28

See infra notes 33–65 and accompanying text.

29

See infra notes 66–97 and accompanying text.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”).
30

31

See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (ﬁnding fair elections require substantial state
regulation); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (ﬁnding electoral regulations necessary
for state independence).
32

Todd J. Zywicki, &EDERAL *UDICIAL 2EVIEW OF 3TATE "ALLOT !CCESS 2EGULATIONS %SCAPE FROM THE
0OLITICAL 4HICKET, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 87, 109 (1994) (explaining the United States Supreme
Court’s history of extreme deference to state electoral regulations); see also Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (noting the states’ long-standing power to regulate
elections); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904) (refusing to ﬁnd the Fourteenth Amendment
made the reasonability of state electoral regulations a federal question). However, the Constitution
places explicit limits on the states’ power to regulate elections and authorizes judicial intervention
in many circumstances. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (preventing states from denying suffrage
based on race); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (denying states the ability to levy poll taxes). But see
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment allows states
to disenfranchise felons).
33
Schultz, supra note 1, at 487–88; see also, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886) (identifying a fundamental right to vote that preserves all other rights); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society.”).
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cannot place excessive burdens on voting rights, especially if doing so denies equal
protection.34
The United States Supreme Court now recognizes a robust, fundamental
right to vote and often relies on the Equal Protection Clause when evaluating
state restrictions on voting rights.35 In (ARPER V 6IRGINIA 3TATE "OARD OF %LECTIONS,
the Court assessed a Virginia law requiring citizens to pay a $1.50 poll tax before
voting.36 The Court held that once states grant citizens voting rights, they may
not qualify them in a manner denying equal protection of the law.37 It found that
Virginia’s poll tax made afﬂuence or payment of a fee an electoral standard, which
bore no relation to a citizen’s qualiﬁcations to vote.38 According to the Court,
state regulations conditioning voting rights on wealth constituted invidious
discrimination, violating the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the size of the
tax or voters’ ability to pay it.39
Following Harper, the Court subjected state election laws to varying levels
of scrutiny.40 Many early decisions, including Harper, seemed to subject such
laws to strict scrutiny.41 Although the Court did not announce strict scrutiny as
the proper standard, it required states to narrowly tailor regulations to achieve
a compelling interest.42 In other decisions, often ballot access cases, the Court
appeared to apply a rational basis test, presuming the constitutionality of state

34
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (ﬁnding a right to vote
implicit in the First Amendment and prohibiting states from restricting it on the basis of a tax);
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (ﬁnding states’ electoral authority
alone does not justify limiting voting rights).
35

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES

AND

POLICIES 842–43 (2d ed.

2002).
36

Harper, 383 U.S. at 664 n.1.

37

Id. at 665.

38

Id. at 667.

39

Id. at 668–69.

40

See Zywicki, supra note 32, at 88–89 (discussing federal courts’ “scatter-shot” election
jurisprudence).
41

Schultz, supra note 1, at 490 (citing cases subjecting voting restrictions to strict scrutiny); see
also Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (subjecting a state poll tax to strict scrutiny); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 24 (1968) (ﬁnding the state lacked a compelling interest in requiring third party candidates
to acquire a large number of signatures in a short time); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972)
(ﬁnding a state’s ballot ﬁling fee required close scrutiny). When courts strictly scrutinize a statute,
they require a compelling governmental interest necessitating that statute and refuse to presume its
constitutionality. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 619 (2d ed. 2005).
42
See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716–19 (1974) (ﬁnding a ﬁxed ﬁling fee unnecessary to
achieve the state’s interest of limiting ballot size).
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regulations and deferring to their proffered rationale.43 In 3TORER V "ROWN, the Court
considered a California statute barring primary election voters from running for
ofﬁce as independent candidates in the subsequent general election.44 The Court
refused to apply strict scrutiny or rational basis review because of the necessity
of substantial state regulation to maintain effective elections.45 The Court said
evaluating regulations requires comparison of the facts and circumstances behind
the law.46 It refrained from applying a traditional strict scrutiny analysis, ﬁnding
the state had a compelling interest in stable elections, but not requiring the state
to narrowly tailor its regulation to that end.47
!NDERSON V #ELEBREZZE went a step beyond Storer and articulated a balancing
test for determining the constitutionality of electoral regulations.48 Anderson
involved an Ohio statute requiring independent Presidential candidates to ﬁle
a nominating petition eight months before the general election.49 According to
the Anderson Court, states must inevitably regulate elections to maintain electoral
integrity.50 The Court articulated a balancing test, which begins by assessing the
character and magnitude of an electoral regulation’s burden on First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.51 Courts should then determine the legitimacy and strength
of each state interest and whether those interests necessitate burdening voting
rights.52 Ohio’s statute imposed a severe burden because it set a deadline far in
advance of the general election, making it difﬁcult for independent candidates
to gather sufﬁcient signatures to obtain ballot access.53 Although Ohio had a

43

See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1986) (declining to require
Washington to show speciﬁc evidence of confusion or ballot overcrowding to justify a statute
requiring minor party candidates to receive at least one percent of primary election votes to appear
on the general election ballot); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 968–69 (1982) (holding a Texas
constitutional provision limiting government ofﬁce holders’ ballot access need only be related to a
rational end and need not be the least restrictive means available).
44

Storer, 415 U.S. at 726.

45

Id. at 729–30.

46

Id. at 730.

47

See id. at 729–30; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1107 (2d ed.

1988).
48

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).

49

Id. at 782–83. The early ﬁling deadline posed difﬁculties for independent candidates
because it required them to submit a requisite number of registered voters’ signatures with their
nominating petitions. See id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257 (Baldwin 2008). Anderson sued
after submitting a nominating petition to run as an independent candidate for President of the
United States after the ﬁling deadline. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782.
50

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 792.
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legitimate interest in voter education and political stability, it failed to show those
ends necessitated an early ﬁling period.54
Although Anderson began as a test for assessing ballot access laws, it evolved
into a general test for assessing electoral regulations.55 For instance, in "URDICK
V 4AKUSHI, the United States Supreme Court assessed a claim that Hawaii’s
prohibition on write-in voting unduly burdened voting rights.56 The Court stated
it would not subject every state electoral regulation to strict scrutiny because
that would hamper states’ ability to ensure equitable and efﬁcient elections.57
The Court transformed Anderson’s rule into a ﬂexible test, adjusting its degree
of scrutiny based on an electoral regulation’s severity.58 The test requires states
to narrowly tailor laws severely burdening voting rights to serve a compelling
governmental purpose.59 Statutes imposing reasonable and non-discriminatory
burdens only require states to show important regulatory interests justify their
statutes.60 Hawaii’s write-in ban imposed a slight burden on voting rights.61 Thus,
Hawaii did not need to demonstrate its law served a compelling interest, and the
State’s interest in preventing divisive “sore loser” elections justiﬁed its statute.62
Some lower federal courts followed "URDICK by applying rational basis or strict
scrutiny review in a binary fashion, while others used a more ﬂexible standard.63

54
Id. at 800–01, 805–06. Anderson based its analysis on a fundamental right to vote and did
not engage in separate Equal Protection analysis. Id. at 786–87 n.7.
55

See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358–59 (1997) (applying
Anderson to Minnesota’s prohibition on cross-party candidate nominations); Eu v. S.F. County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989) (applying Anderson to California’s prohibition
on party endorsement of election candidates).
56
504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992). Burdick sued Hawaii because its statute prevented him from
casting a write-in protest vote for Donald Duck. Id. at 438.
57

Id. at 433.

58

Id. at 434. The Court explained:
[W]hen [First and Fourteenth Amendment] rights are subjected to “severe”
restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest
of compelling importance.” But when a state election law provision imposes only
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” . . . “the State’s important regulatory
interests are generally sufﬁcient to justify” the restrictions.

Id. (citations omitted); see also McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir.
1995) (stating "URDICK modiﬁed Anderson by subjecting severe burdens to strict scrutiny).
59

"URDICK, 504 U.S. at 434.

60

Id.; see also Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992) (requiring states to show a
corresponding interest sufﬁcient to justify electoral regulations and subjecting severe regulations to
strict scrutiny).
61

"URDICK, 504 U.S. at 438–49.

62

Id. at 439. Hawaii feared losing primary candidates would disrupt general elections with
intraparty disputes. Id.
63
Darla L. Shaffer, 4ENTH #IRCUIT 3URVEY "ALLOT !CCESS ,AWS, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 657, 665–66
(1996). While some courts interpreted "URDICK as requiring either the application of strict scrutiny
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Although "URDICK professed to establish a ﬂexible test, it remained unclear
whether "URDICK superseded the Court’s traditional tiers of scrutiny.64 Confusion
also remained because the Court failed to articulate a method for determining a
statute’s severity.65

6OTER )DENTIlCATION ,AWS
Several states complicated the judiciary’s approach to voting rights by passing
controversial laws requiring citizens to show identiﬁcation before voting.66
Voter-identiﬁcation statutes stem from Congress’ attempt to modernize election
administration: the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”).67 Among other
provisions, HAVA sets forth minimum identiﬁcation requirements for state
elections.68 HAVA resulted from political compromise and contained less strict

or rational basis, others disagreed. See Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916, 921
(6th Cir. 1998) (imposing rational basis review on regulations imposing incidental or “reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions”); League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 965 F. Supp. 96, 100 (D.
Me. 1997) (interpreting "URDICK as subjecting severe restrictions to strict scrutiny and reasonable
restrictions to rational basis review). But see Rogers v. Corbett, 468 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“[B]allot access cases should not be pegged into the three aforementioned categories.”); Reform
Party of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 314 (3d Cir.
1999) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a law prohibiting minor party cross-nominations). For
an in-depth analysis of standards of review following "URDICK, see Christopher S. Elmendorf,
3TRUCTURING *UDICIAL 2EVIEW OF %LECTORAL -ECHANICS %XPLANATIONS AND /PPORTUNITIES, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 313, 330 n.66 (2007).
64
See Alan Brownstein, (OW 2IGHTS ARE )NFRINGED 4HE 2OLE OF 5NDUE "URDEN !NALYSIS IN
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 867, 917 (1994) (arguing "URDICK left the Court’s
traditional, discrete tiers of scrutiny unchanged); Kevin Cofsky, Comment, 0RUNING THE 0OLITICAL
4HICKET 4HE #ASE FOR 3TRICT 3CRUTINY OF 3TATE "ALLOT !CCESS 2ESTRICTIONS, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 353,
386–87 (1996) (arguing the "URDICK sliding-scale created covert tiered scrutiny). The balancing
approach in Anderson and "URDICK mirrors the undue burden analysis in 0LANNED 0ARENTHOOD V
Casey. Brownstein, supra note 64, at 918; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 872–74 (1992) (comparing the Court’s undue burden analysis in ballot access cases to women’s
reproductive autonomy cases).
65
See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found. Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 208 (1999) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (arguing courts applying "URDICK failed to coherently distinguish severe and lesser
burdens); Schultz, supra note 1, at 492 (arguing "URDICK created confusion by failing to deﬁne severe
burdens).
66

Joyce Purnick, 3TRICTER 6OTING ,AWS #ARVE ,ATEST 0ARTISAN $IVIDE, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006,

at A1.
67

42 U.S.C. § 15483 (2000, Supp. 2008). The United States House of Representatives passed
a national voter-identiﬁcation act, but it died in the Senate. See Federal Election Integrity Act of
2006, H.R. 4844, 109th Cong., 152 CONG. REC. H. 6765 (2006) (amending HAVA to require
voters to show photo-identiﬁcation before voting); David Mikhail, '/0 6OTER )$ ,EGISLATION -AY
"E #ASUALTY OF $EMS 4AKEOVER, THE HILL (Wash. D.C.), Nov. 15, 2006, at 6 (describing H.R. 4844’s
probable demise).
See Center for Democracy and Election Management, American University, BUILDING
CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM 2–3
(2005), available at http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 23,
68
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voter-identiﬁcation requirements than many subsequent state regulations.69 It
mandates that states require ﬁrst-time voters who register by mail and do not
verify their identity with their mail-in registration to provide identiﬁcation before
voting.70 The statute allows voters to present non-photo forms of identiﬁcation.71
HAVA sets the ground ﬂoor for states’ voter-identiﬁcation laws and allows states to
establish more strict standards.72 States responded to HAVA by passing a variety of
voting regulations, some of which required voters to provide photo identiﬁcation
before voting.73
Several parties sued state governments on the theory that voter-identiﬁcation
laws unduly burdened voting rights, forcing courts to address voting rights in
new circumstances.74 Lower federal courts diverged in responding to challenges

2008) [hereinafter Carter-Baker] (outlining the components of HAVA); Robert S. Montjoy, HAVA
and the State, in ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY 16–31 (Daniel J. Palazzolo & James W.
Ceaser eds., 2005) (detailing HAVA requirements).
69
Carter-Baker, supra note 68, at 4. The Carter-Baker Commission criticized HAVA for
providing vague provisions and not adequately addressing voter fraud. Id.
70

42 U.S.C. § 15483(b).

71

Id.

72

Id. § 15484; $EVELOPMENTS IN THE ,AW SUPRA note 3, at 1148–49. HAVA also gives states
discretion in how to carry out its requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 15485.
73
$EVELOPMENTS IN THE ,AW SUPRA note 3, at 1148–49. Some states, such as North Dakota,
declared themselves exempt from HAVA and have not yet been challenged. Id. at 1148 n.23. Many
states follow HAVA guidelines, but do not require photo-identiﬁcation. Spencer Overton, Voter
Identiﬁcation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 640 (2007). Seventeen states accept non-photo identiﬁcation.
See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 3TATE 2EQUIREMENTS FOR 6OTER )$, Oct. 23, 2008, http://
www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/taskfc/VoterIDReq.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (noting
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri,
Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington require
identiﬁcation, but accept non-photo identiﬁcation). Seven states went beyond HAVA guidelines
and require voters to show photo-identiﬁcation before voting. See id. (noting Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, and South Dakota require photo identiﬁcation). One local
government, Albuquerque, New Mexico, also established identiﬁcation requirements. ACLU of
N.M. v. Santillanes (Santillanes I), 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605–06 (D.N.M. 2007). Other states
continue to debate voter-identiﬁcation statutes. Editorial, 4HE -YTH OF 6OTER &RAUD, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2008, at A20 (stating many state legislatures assume #RAWFORD )) vindicated all voteridentiﬁcation laws and noting twenty states considering new voter-identiﬁcation statutes).
74
Ohio State University: Election Law @ Moritz,  6OTER )$ ,ITIGATION #HART, May 15,
2008, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/news/2006VoterIDLitigationChart4.php (last visited
Oct. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Moritz] (noting suits ﬁled in Ohio, Michigan, Georgia, Arizona, New
Mexico, Indiana, and Missouri). Michigan, Indiana, and Missouri litigation has concluded; parties
are settling in Ohio; litigation is pending in Arizona; and Georgia and Indiana litigation is on
appeal. Id. Missouri litigation involved a challenge to a state law (“SB 1014”) requiring voters to
present photo-identiﬁcation, alleging it violated voting rights under the Missouri Constitution.
Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006). The 7EINSCHENK court subjected SB 1014
to strict scrutiny and held Missouri had a compelling interest in stopping voter fraud, but found the
state failed to narrowly tailor its statute, violating the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 221; see also MO.
CONST. art. I, § 25 (guaranteeing the right of suffrage).
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to photo-identiﬁcation laws.75 Courts struggled to ﬁnd analogous laws assessed
by the United States Supreme Court, leading to disparate outcomes.76 Three
decisions illustrate how federal courts assessed voter-identiﬁcation laws prior to
#RAWFORD )): #OMMON #AUSE'EORGIA V "ILLUPS (Billups I), Indiana Democratic
0ARTY V 2OKITA, and !#,5 OF .EW -EXICO V 3ANTILLANES (Santillanes I).77
In #OMMON #AUSE'EORGIA V "ILLUPS (Billups I), plaintiffs challenged Georgia’s
photo-identiﬁcation statute, arguing it imposed an undue burden on voting rights.78
House Bill 244 (“HB 244”) required all in-person voters in Georgia to present
government-issued photo-identiﬁcation.79 Although the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia applied the "URDICK sliding-scale test
to HB 244, it engaged in a separate strict scrutiny analysis and held HB 244
unconstitutional under both approaches.80 Although Georgia had an important
state interest in preventing fraud, it failed to narrowly tailor HB 244 because the
statute addressed in-person fraud instead of absentee ballot fraud, which posed a
greater threat to electoral integrity.81 When the district court examined HB 244
under "URDICK, it determined the law imposed a severe burden because many
voters lacked identiﬁcation and would likely ﬁnd sufﬁcient identiﬁcation difﬁcult
to obtain.82 The district court found HB 244 lacked a rational relation, much

75
See Overton, supra note 73, at 665–66 (noting that, lacking guidance, federal courts engage
in ad hoc analysis of voter-identiﬁcation cases and justify different results from similar facts).
76

See Schultz, supra note 1, at 492 (arguing the Court failed to deﬁne severe burdens, leaving
confusion); Elmendorf, supra note 63, at 319 (“[C]ourts have not been able to locate [United States]
Supreme Court precedents addressing formally similar laws. For example, most courts have thought
it strained to analogize ID requirements to poll taxes if the state charges no fee for its voter ID.”);
Kelly T. Brewer, Note, $ISENFRANCHISE 4HIS 3TATE 6OTER )$ ,AWS AND THEIR $ISCONTENTS ! "LUEPRINT FOR
"RINGING 3UCCESSFUL %QUAL 0ROTECTION AND 0OLL 4AX #LAIMS, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 191, 217–18 (2007)
(describing the non-uniform approach of federal courts). Despite different outcomes, a clear circuit
split did not exist prior to #RAWFORD )). See Edward B. Foley, Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board: 6OTER )$   )F 3O 3O 7HAT, 7 ELECTION L.J. 63, 63 (2008) (suggesting the Court granted
certiorari to stave off a voter-identiﬁcation suit related to the 2008 election).
77
See generally Santillanes I, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 598; Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F.
Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2007), aff ’d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. (#RAWFORD
I), 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007); Billups I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005); infra notes
78–97.
78

Billups I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1328–29. The plaintiffs alleged Georgia’s requirement violated
the Georgia Constitution, the U.S. Constitution, and federal civil rights and voting rights statutes.
Id.
79

Id. at 1331. The requirement exempted non-ﬁrst time absentee voters. Id. at 1337–38.

80

Id. at 1361–62.

81

Id. at 1361; see also Cathy Cox, ,ETTER FROM #ATHY #OX 'A 3ECY OF 3TATE TO 3ONNY 0ERDUE
'OVERNOR OF 'A (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/VotingRights/VotingRights.
cfm?ID=18652&c=168 (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (stating HB 244 enhanced opportunities for
absentee ballot fraud while focusing on non-existent in-person voter fraud).
82

Billups I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.
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less a narrow tailoring, to Georgia’s stated purpose of ﬁghting voter fraud because
the State lacked evidence of in-person voter fraud.83 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction because it held the plaintiffs could likely succeed in their
Fourteenth Amendment challenge.84
In )NDIANA $EMOCRATIC 0ARTY V 2OKITA, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana evaluated the constitutionality of Indiana’s
voter-identiﬁcation law, SEA 483.85 The 2OKITA court applied the "URDICK slidingscale test, but in a different manner than Billups I.86 It refused to apply strict
scrutiny because the plaintiffs presented no evidence of voters or groups having
been prevented from voting or facing signiﬁcant barriers in doing so.87 The court
subjected SEA 483 to something akin to a rational basis test, holding Indiana’s
important regulatory interests justiﬁed SEA 483’s reasonable, nondiscriminatory
burden.88 2OKITA suggested a trend of federal courts using "URDICK to analyze
voter-identiﬁcation laws, breaking from the Billups I court’s suggestion that strict
scrutiny may be appropriate.89
!#,5 V 3ANTILLANES (Santillanes I) differed from other voter-identiﬁcation
cases because it involved a city, rather than a state, voter-identiﬁcation law.90 The
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico assessed whether
an amendment to the Election Code of the Albuquerque City Charter requiring
Albuquerque voters to present photo-identiﬁcation violated the United States

83

Id.

84

Id. Georgia adjusted its statute to allow more kinds of identiﬁcation, but the district court
granted a preliminary injunction barring its enforcement prior to the July 2006 election. Common
Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups II), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2006). After another
sequence of litigation, the district court held the statute did not constitute an undue burden on
voting rights. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups III), 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1382 (N.D. Ga.
2007). Although Billups III considered identical facts to Billups I, it likely arrived at a contrary result
because it modeled its reasoning on the intervening decision in )NDIANA $EMOCRATIC 0ARTY V 2OKITA.
Brewer, supra note 76, at 217–18; see also infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs
appealed Billups III to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit where litigation
is pending. Moritz, supra note 74.
85

2OKITA, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 786.

86

Id. at 821.

87

Id. at 822, 823–24.

88

Id. at 826. The 2OKITA court distinguished Billups I because it involved a non-publicized
absentee ballot law, a decision in a different jurisdiction, and a ruling on a preliminary injunction.
Id. at 831–32.
89
See id. at 822 (applying "URDICK as the proper standard for evaluating voter-identiﬁcation
laws); Brewer, supra note 76, at 217–18 (arguing 2OKITA demonstrated a trend of federal courts
applying "URDICK to voter-identiﬁcation laws). In 0URCELL V 'ONZALEZ, the United States Supreme
Court suggested in dicta it may take a balancing approach to voter identiﬁcation, acknowledging
the competing concerns of voting rights and fraud. 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
90

Santillanes I, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 605–06.
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Constitution.91 The district court applied the "URDICK sliding-scale test, noting
the severity of the regulation would determine the correct standard of review.92
It found the amendment severely burdened voting rights because it surprised
voters and introduced obstacles likely to discourage many citizens from voting.93
Although the city had a compelling interest in preventing fraud, it failed to
narrowly tailor the amendment because little in-person fraud existed, the statute’s
vagueness enabled arbitrary enforcement, and the city failed to implement less
restrictive alternatives.94 Thus, the Santillanes I court concluded Albuquerque’s
voter-identiﬁcation law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.95 Santillanes I,
2OKITA, and Billups I demonstrate the pre-#RAWFORD )) confusion about how to
apply "URDICK to voter-identiﬁcation laws.96 Each case weighed the beneﬁts and
burdens of such laws in different ways due to the lack of a clear standard, thus
setting the stage for #RAWFORD )).97

PRINCIPAL CASE
In #RAWFORD V -ARION #OUNTY %LECTION "OARD (#RAWFORD ))), the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Indiana’s voter-identiﬁcation
law (“SEA 483”).98 On appeal from )NDIANA $EMOCRATIC 0ARTY V 2OKITA, the Indiana
Democratic Party argued the district court erred in ﬁnding Indiana’s photoidentiﬁcation law imposed a non-severe burden.99 According to the petitioners,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit focused on the ease of
voter compliance with SEA 483, rather than the nature of the burden it imposed
on voting rights by creating hurdles for prospective voters.100 The Democratic
91

Id. at 605–06.

92

Id. at 628–29.

93

Id. at 636. The district court distinguished 2OKITA because SEA 483 made absentee voting
available to more voters than did Albuquerque’s amendment. Id. at 639.
94

Id. at 637, 640–41.

95

Santillanes I, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 641–42. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, applying #RAWFORD )) and holding that Albuquerque’s
amendment could withstand a facial challenge. ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes (Santillanes II), No.
07-2067, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23548, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 17, 2008).
96

See Schultz, supra note 1, at 492 (describing confusion among federal courts in applying
"URDICK).
97

Id.

98

128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); see supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.

99

Brief for Petitioners, at 40–42, 47, #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 07-21), 2006 WL
1786073; see also Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 826 (S.D. Ind. 2006),
aff ’d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. (#RAWFORD )), 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir.
2007) (upholding the constitutionality of SEA 483). Other organizations and ofﬁcials, including
Crawford, joined the Democratic Party. #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
100

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 99, at 35–36. According to the petitioners, the Seventh
Circuit determined SEA 483’s severity based on the number of voters it disenfranchised, rather than
based on whether it made voting more difﬁcult for affected individuals. Id. at 27–28.
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Party argued such a restriction was severe by nature, requiring strict scrutiny.101
The petitioners also argued SEA 483 would interfere with the voting rights
of thousands of Indiana voters, with a disproportionate impact on the elderly,
racial minorities, the poor, and the disabled.102 The petitioners conceded that
Indiana had a compelling interest in preventing fraud, but argued no evidence of
in-person voter fraud existed in Indiana.103 Consequently, the petitioners argued
Indiana failed to narrowly tailor SEA 483, making it an unconstitutional burden
on voting rights.104
The respondents argued the petitioners failed to show SEA 483 prevented
citizens from voting and suggested the Court should not apply strict scrutiny.105
They pointed to a lack of evidence showing SEA 483 discriminated against
different classes of voters.106 The respondents further argued Indiana had a
compelling interest in stopping fraud and referenced evidence of voter fraud.107
Finally, they argued SEA 483 reasonably restricted voting rights and provided
safeguards to prevent disenfranchisement.108
In a 3-3-2-1 decision, the United States Supreme Court afﬁrmed the Seventh
Circuit’s decision.109 Despite the lack of a majority opinion, a plurality held SEA
483 could withstand a facial challenge.110 When the Court produces no majority
rationale, its holding may be interpreted as the approach of the Justices who
concurred with the judgment on the narrowest grounds.111 Although the Court
has done little to deﬁne “narrowest grounds,” that phrase may refer to the opinion
that is most conﬁned to the issues and facts necessary to resolve the case at hand.112
Justice Stevens’ opinion may constitute #RAWFORD ))S holding because it limits the

101

Id.

102

Id. at 39.

103

Id. at 46–47.

104

Id. at 54–55, 60–61.

105

Brief for Respondent Marion County Election Board, at 19–22, #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct.
1610 (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2006 WL 2180191. The respondents included Marion County Election
Board and Todd Rokita, Indiana’s Secretary of State. Id.
106

Id. at 30–31.

107

Id. at 47–49.

108

Id. at 56–59.

109

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1624.

110

Id.

111

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
112
United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872–73 (2d Cir. 1981) (interpreting “narrowest
grounds” as those conﬁning themselves to the present case and affecting fewer future cases); Linda
Novak, Note, 4HE 0RECEDENTIAL 6ALUE OF 3UPREME #OURT 0LURALITY $ECISIONS, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756,
761–63, 767 (1980).
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scope of its conclusion based on its SEA-speciﬁc ﬁndings regarding fraud and
disenfranchisement.113

*USTICE 3TEVENS /PINION *OINED BY #HIEF *USTICE 2OBERTS AND *USTICE +ENNEDY
Justice Stevens’ opinion likely constitutes the Court’s holding because it uses
the narrowest reasoning.114 It applied the "URDICK sliding-scale test to determine
whether SEA 483 imposed a severe burden on voting rights, justifying strict
scrutiny.115 The opinion noted the lack of a litmus test for determining which
level of scrutiny to use and stated it would weigh the injury to voting rights
against the State’s interests in favor of the regulation.116 Due to the lack of concrete
evidence of disenfranchisement, Justice Stevens’ opinion found the statute did not
excessively burden the rights of any class of voters.117 It refused to apply strict
scrutiny and found the State’s interest in securing electoral integrity gave the
statute a plainly legitimate sweep, overcoming the plaintiffs’ facial challenge.118
Indiana’s interests in modernizing elections, maintaining voter conﬁdence, and
detecting and deterring voter fraud justiﬁed the minimal burden posed by SEA
483.119 Although the statute imposed a special burden on the elderly and poor,
provisional ballots solved those problems.120 The petitioners failed to demonstrate
the act’s invalidity in all circumstances, so the Court rejected the facial challenge to

See Erwin Chemerinsky, 7HEN )T -ATTERS -OST )T )S 3TILL THE +ENNEDY #OURT, 11 GREEN BAG
2d 427, 428, 440 (2008) (noting how Justice Stevens’ opinion was largely based on the record before
the Court, leaving the possibility of a different result with a more thorough record); #RAWFORD )),
128 S. Ct. at 1623–24 (noting how different evidence may demonstrate that a voter-identiﬁcation
statute is unconstitutional as applied). In contrast, the concurring opinion announces a broader rule
whereby courts defer to state interests whenever an electoral regulation imposes a uniform burden.
3EE #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit has interpreted the balancing test articulated in Justice Stevens’ opinion as the
Court’s holding. See ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes (Santillanes II), No. 07-2067, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23548, at *18-19 (10th Cir. Nov. 17, 2008); see also Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v.
Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1249–51 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (applying Justice Stevens’ opinion as
the holding of #RAWFORD ))).
113

114

See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.

115

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1616.

116

Id.; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (holding courts should compare
the asserted injury to voting rights against the state’s interest in a regulation).
117

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1622–23.

118

Id. at 1623.

119

Id. at 1617–20.

120

Id. at 1620–21. Indiana allows voters lacking identiﬁcation on election day to cast provisional ballots, which the State counts if the voters present valid identiﬁcation within ten days. Id.
According to the Court, these ballots safeguarded the rights of the few who lack identiﬁcation on
election day because of “life’s vagaries.” Id. at 1620.
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SEA 483.121 Although Justice Stevens’ opinion found evidence of partisanship in
SEA 483’s passage, partisanship alone failed to demonstrate an Equal Protection
violation, especially when assessing a nondiscriminatory law with valid neutral
justiﬁcations.122

#ONCURRING /PINION *USTICE 3CALIA JOINED BY *USTICES 4HOMAS AND !LITO
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito concurred in the judgment, but disagreed
with Justice Stevens’ reliance on a sliding-scale test.123 The concurrence’s rationale
was less narrow than that of the lead opinion and, therefore, is not the Court’s
holding.124 Under the concurrence’s broader rationale, "URDICK required the Court
to apply an important regulatory interests standard, deferring to the State’s interest
in maintaining effective elections when evaluating non-severe, non-discriminatory
regulations.125 According to the concurrence, "URDICK transformed Anderson’s
ﬂexible standard into an administrable rule.126 The concurrence noted SEA 483
did not impose a special burden on any group of voters.127 Rather, it imposed
a uniform burden on all voters, but had different impacts on speciﬁc groups of
voters.128 All voters, regardless of their economic status, faced the same burden
in voting, making SEA 483 non-discriminatory.129 Disparate impact, absent
evidence of discriminatory intent, failed to demonstrate a neutral law violated
equal protection or required strict scrutiny.130 Applying an important regulatory
interests standard, the concurrence concluded SEA 483 constituted a reasonable
electoral regulation, and Indiana’s interest in preventing voter fraud justiﬁed SEA
483’s minimal burden.131 The concurrence also argued Justice Stevens’ case-bycase application of Anderson would invite future challenges, producing electoral
instability and infringing upon states’ rights.132
121
Id. at 1621–22; see also, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.
Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008) (holding a facial challenge only succeeds if all applications of a law violate
the Constitution).
122

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1624.

123

Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring).

124

See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.

125

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring).

126

Id.

127

Id. at 1625.

128

Id. at 1625; see also "URDICK, 504 U.S. at 436–37 (examining the effect of a law on voters in
general, not particular individuals).
129

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring).

130

Id.; see also Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005) (ﬁnding easy to overcome,
generalized, and non-discriminatory restrictions insufﬁciently severe to trigger strict scrutiny);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding generally applicable, non-discriminatory
laws do not violate Equal Protection absent discriminatory intent).
131

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1627 (Scalia, J., concurring).

132

Id. at 1626–27.
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$ISSENTING /PINION *USTICE 3OUTER JOINED BY *USTICE 'INSBURG
Justices Souter and Ginsburg agreed the "URDICK sliding-scale test provided
the proper test for evaluating electoral restrictions, but took issue with how Justice
Stevens’ opinion applied that test.133 The dissent argued the Court must apply
"URDICK to the speciﬁc beneﬁts and burdens of the present case.134 The dissenters
found Indiana’s reference to abstract interests in electoral integrity failed to
sufﬁciently justify its restriction on voting rights.135 According to the dissent,
states must provide a factual showing that speciﬁc threats outweigh the burden on
voting.136 It found SEA 483’s burden had a large and disparate enough of an impact
to justify comparing it to the state interest.137 The dissent found Indiana failed
to justify its restriction with evidence of fraud and doubted SEA 483 addressed
existing fraud.138 Consequently, the dissent found the state interest failed to justify
a restriction placing a greater burden on poor and minority voters.139

$ISSENTING /PINION *USTICE "REYER
In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer also suggested the Court should use a
balancing test.140 He agreed with Justice Stevens’ opinion that photo-identiﬁcation
statutes could be constitutional.141 However, Justice Breyer found none of Indiana’s
interests justiﬁed SEA 483’s disproportionate burden on eligible voters without
identiﬁcation.142

133

Id. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting).

134

Id. at 1627.

135

Id.

136

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting).

137

Id. at 1634. The dissent discussed how the burden of travel has worse effects on some voters
based on circumstance. Id. at 1628–29. It also noted the most common sources of identiﬁcation
cost money, a cost falling disproportionately on the poor. Id. at 1630–31.
138

Id. at 1638–39. The dissent also argued Indiana’s bloated rolls resulted from its own
negligence and failed to justify restricting voters. Id. at 1641–42. Similarly, the State’s interest in
maintaining voter conﬁdence resulted from its own shortcomings. Id. at 1642.
139

Id. at 1643.

140

Id. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would balance the voting-related interests that the
statute affects, asking ‘whether the statute burdens any one such interest . . . out of proportion to
the statute’s salutary effects upon the others . . . .”) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
141

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1643–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

142

Id. at 1645. Justice Breyer noted, although the Carter-Baker Commission suggested voteridentiﬁcation requirements, it also concluded states should phase in such laws providing sufﬁcient
time for states to provide identiﬁcation to those who lacked it. Id. at 1644.
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ANALYSIS
This section assesses the implications of #RAWFORD V -ARION #OUNTY "OARD
OF %LECTIONS (#RAWFORD ))). Although #RAWFORD )) provided guidance on how to
evaluate voter-identiﬁcation statutes, it failed to compare the concrete beneﬁts and
burdens of SEA 483.143 Justice Stevens’ opinion applied "URDICKS sliding-scale test
in a lopsided manner, giving Indiana the beneﬁt of the doubt while undervaluing
the nature and magnitude of voter-identiﬁcation laws’ burdens on voting rights.144
The Court placed the initial burden of proof on those challenging identiﬁcation
laws, preventing actual balancing until challengers provide quantitative evidence of
disenfranchisement.145 The Court should have applied "URDICK in a more balanced
fashion, adjusting the tailoring required of the statute based on its beneﬁts and
burdens.146

! ,OPSIDED "ALANCING 4EST
On the surface, #RAWFORD )) resolved lower federal court disagreements over
which test to use when hearing challenges to voter-identiﬁcation statutes.147 Most
lower courts correctly used the "URDICK test to assess whether voter-identiﬁcation
statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment, even if courts applied it in disparate
ways.148 Under Justice Stevens’ opinion, this analysis depends on the facts of

143

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting).

144

See id. (pointing to the Stevens opinion’s skewed balancing of interests); Rick Hasen,
)NITIAL 4HOUGHTS ON THE 3UPREME #OURTS /PINION IN Crawford, the Indiana Voter Identiﬁcation Case,
ELECTION LAW BLOG, Apr. 28, 2008, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010701.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2008) (arguing #RAWFORD )) only requires states to offer plausible pretexts to justify voteridentiﬁcation laws, while requiring voters to show speciﬁc burdens).
145
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing in favor of a ﬂexible standard for assessing ﬁrearms regulations as opposed to presuming
such laws are constitutional); Cofsky, supra note 64, at 386–87 (arguing "URDICK might lead to veiled
tiered scrutiny and a presumption of constitutionality).
146

3EE #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting the Court should
balance SEA 483’s beneﬁts and burdens, asking whether it burdens voting rights disproportionate
to its beneﬁts).
147

Id. at 1616 (lead opinion).

See Daniel P. Tokaji, *UDICIAL 2EVIEW OF %LECTION !DMINISTRATION, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 379, 384 (2007), available at http://pennumbra.com/responses/response.php?rid=38
(last accessed November 15, 2008) (noting how many lower courts used "URDICK to evaluate voteridentiﬁcation cases); Elizabeth D. Lauzon, #ONSTITUTIONALITY OF 2EQUIRING 0RESENTATION OF 0HOTOGRAPHIC
)DENTIlCATION IN /RDER TO 6OTE, 27 A.L.R.6th 541 (2007) (noting most federal courts applied "URDICK
to voter-identiﬁcation laws, although some applied strict scrutiny, and how Justice Stevens’ opinion
in #RAWFORD )) adopted a balancing approach).
148
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speciﬁc situations rather than a pre-existing formula.149 Although the Court based
its approach on "URDICK, it departed from prior precedent because it assessed SEA
483’s burden on speciﬁc voters, rather than its systemic burden on all voters.150
In applying "URDICK, the Court morphed its balanced sliding-scale test into
a lopsided balancing test.151 "URDICK required the Court to balance all relevant
interests in favor of and against an electoral regulation.152 In contrast, the
#RAWFORD )) Court found the magnitude of SEA 483’s injury non-severe and
avoided comparing it to the State’s interest.153 Although the Court discussed the
legitimacy of Indiana’s interest in stopping fraud, modernizing elections, and
ensuring electoral legitimacy, no comparison of those interests to the character and
magnitude of the burden on voting rights occurred.154 This deviates from "URDICK,
which required thorough evaluation of the State’s rationale and the degree to
which that interest necessitated burdening voting rights.155 Justice Stevens’ opinion
examined evidence showing SEA 483’s burden on voting with a skeptical eye, but
accepted Indiana’s claims of voter fraud at face value and did not require concrete

149
#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1616; see also Am. Assoc. of People with Disabilities v. Herrera,
No. CIV 08-0702, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82597, at *54-57 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2008) (ﬁnding
that #RAWFORD )) afﬁrmed Anderson’s sliding-scale as the proper test for assessing challenges to state
electoral regulations).
150

Reply Brief for Petitioners at 6–7, #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 07-25), 2007 WL
4466632 (“[B]URDICK clearly calls upon courts to assess voting regulations facially. "URDICK itself
was a facial attack on a law that burdened the rights of only a subset of voters.”); see also Tokaji,
supra note 18 (arguing #RAWFORD )) erroneously focused on SEA 483’s burden on individual voters,
avoiding its systemic burdens and “skewing effect on the electorate”); Chemerinsky, supra note 113,
at 441 (arguing #RAWFORD )) broke from Harper); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
668 (1966) (ﬁnding it irrelevant whether the plaintiffs could identify individuals disenfranchised
by a $1.50 poll tax and holding the tax facially invalid because it introduced a standard irrelevant
to voter qualiﬁcations).
151

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting); Hasen, supra note 144 (arguing
Justice Stevens’ opinion failed to accurately compare SEA 483’s beneﬁts and burdens).
152

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
730 (1974) (“The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be
made.”); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (“In approaching candidate restrictions, it is
essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters.”).
153
#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (“[T]he statute’s broad application to all Indiana voters
. . . ‘imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights.’ The ‘precise interests’ advanced by the State
are therefore sufﬁcient to defeat petitioners’ facial challenge to SEA 483.”) (quoting "URDICK, 504
U.S. at 434, 439).
154

Id. at 1635–36 (Souter, J., dissenting).

155

See "URDICK, 504 U.S. at 434 (comparing the actual beneﬁts and burdens of Hawaii’s
write-in ban).
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evidence in support of those claims.156 Since the petitioners failed to provide
quantiﬁable evidence of a burden, the Court did not compare the interests.157
Consequently, Indiana’s theoretical interest in stopping fraud justiﬁed the burden
its statute imposed on voting rights.158 Rather than balancing based on the relative
strengths of each interest, Justice Stevens’ opinion found the petitioners failed to
demonstrate SEA 483’s burden in terms of quantiﬁable disenfranchisement and
accepted the State’s speculative interest in ﬁghting fraud.159 The Court used a
lopsided balancing test to evaluate voter-identiﬁcation laws, requiring a higher
standard of proof from those who challenge such laws than from states seeking
to justify them.160 If the Court ﬁnds the statute lacks a quantiﬁable burden,

156

#RAWFORD )) 128 S. Ct. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to Souter’s dissent:
[A] State may not burden the right to vote merely by invoking abstract interests, be
they legitimate, or even compelling, but must make a particular, factual showing
that threats to its interests outweigh the particular impediments it has imposed. The
State has made no such justiﬁcation here, and as to some aspects of its law, it has
hardly even tried.

Id. (citation omitted). Courts should apply "URDICK to state interests with a skeptical eye, conducting
more than a cursory examination of a state’s abstract interests and not allowing states to “swat ﬂies
with a hammer.” Chad Flanders, (OW TO 4HINK ABOUT 6OTER &RAUD AND 7HY , 41 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 93, 152–53 (2007); see also Richard L. Hasen, #OURTS .EED TO +EEP A 3KEPTICAL %YE ON .EW
6OTER )DENTIlCATION ,AWS, Ohio State University: Election Law @ Moritz, Apr. 24, 2007, http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=147 (last visited Oct. 24, 2008)
(arguing courts should examine fraud claims skeptically in light of their partisan background and
lack of empirical basis). Justice Stevens’ opinion rigorously deconstructed the petitioners’ evidence
of disenfranchisement. #RAWFORD )) 128 S. Ct. at 1623. It criticized the petitioners’ statistics for
using old numbers, not demonstrating the lack of transportation proves the lack of opportunity to
obtain identiﬁcation, and not demonstrating a distribution of voters lacking identiﬁcation. Id. at
1623 n.20. In contrast, Justice Stevens’ opinion accepted “scattered instances” of fraud elsewhere
in the United States, justifying the State’s interest. Id. at 1618–19; 1619 n.10. This bears similarity
to the lopsided applications of lower federal courts. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 507–08, 525–26
(describing federal courts’ imbalanced interpretation of "URDICK).
157

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1635–36 (Souter, J., dissenting).

158

Id. at 1622 (lead opinion). According to Justice Stevens’ opinion, “[SEA 483’s] broad
application to all Indiana voters . . . ‘imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights.’ The ‘precise
interests’ advanced by the State are therefore sufﬁcient to defeat petitioners’ facial challenge to SEA
483.” Id. (quoting "URDICK, 504 U.S. at 434, 439).
159

Id. at 1623. Justice Stevens’ opinion failed to discuss degrees of necessity or how narrowly
Indiana must tailor SEA 483. Id. The unquantiﬁable nature of the threat to voting rights triggered
a kind of rational basis review whereby a “sufﬁciently strong” justiﬁcation for a neutral law sufﬁced
to withstand a Fourteenth Amendment challenge. See id. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
Justice Stevens’ opinion failed to engage in the hard weighing of interests required by "URDICK). The
Court’s approach had more in common with lower federal courts that assumed "URDICK demanded
an either/or choice between rational basis review and strict scrutiny based on the severity of the law
in question, rather than courts that used a more ﬂexible sliding-scale with intermediate standards of
review. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 531 (arguing lower courts mistakenly applied "URDICK as a binary
choice between rational basis review and strict scrutiny).
160

Hasen, supra note 144 (arguing the Court tipped the sliding-scale in favor of the state’s
interest). After 7ASHINGTON 3TATE 'RANGE, Prof. Hasen suggested the Court might be moving in this
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little weighing of interests occurs and the Court will likely defer to the state’s
regulatory interest.161 Such a deferential test poses substantial problems to future
voter-identiﬁcation law challenges because a court’s initial adoption of a standard
of review often determines the outcome of an election law challenge.162
The Court’s lopsided balancing test makes it extremely difﬁcult to facially
challenge a voter-identiﬁcation law.163 #RAWFORD )) involved a facial challenge
because the petitioners alleged that all applications of SEA 483 violated the
Constitution.164 While Justice Stevens’ opinion made such challenges difﬁcult,
it did not foreclose the possibility of as-applied challenges, which allege that a
law’s particular application violates the Constitution.165 If a regulation imposes
a minimal burden on the public and the legislature offers a neutral pretext,
regardless of the strength of the evidence supporting that interest, the statute will
likely survive a facial challenge.166 Groups facing a disparate impact must challenge
voter-identiﬁcation laws as applied to speciﬁc situations and offer quantitative

direction: “If a state tries to justify its election law, it can do so by merely positing—not proving—the
existence of voter confusion. . . . [I]f voters . . . want to challenge a law, then they need to come
forward with actual evidence . . . .” Id.
161
Compare #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (holding SEA 483’s limited burden on all voters
sufﬁced to overcome a facial challenge), WITH Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)
(requiring the state to show a corresponding interest sufﬁciently weighty to justify denying parties
the right to name themselves).
162

Samuel P. Langholz, Note, &ASHIONING A #ONSTITUTIONAL 6OTER )DENTIlCATION 2EQUIREMENT, 93
IOWA L. REV. 731, 771–72 (2008) (arguing the burden often determines a case’s outcome by setting
the level of scrutiny). In unpublished decisions, some federal courts have interpreted #RAWFORD ))
in this fashion, deferring to states’ abstract interests rather than engaging in actual balancing. See
Tex. Democratic Party v. Williams, No. 07-51064, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16406, at *1–2 (5th Cir.
July 30, 2008) (holding a district court correctly applied rational basis review to a voting system
not allowing straight-ticket voters to emphasize votes because the statute imposed a non-severe
burden); Herrera, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82597, at *90 (ﬁnding no distinction between Justice
Stevens’ sliding-scale approach and Justice Scalia’s deferential two-track approach where an election
law imposes a non-severe burden); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69542, at *48 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (applying rational basis review to a
voting system imposing minimal burdens on visually and manually impaired citizens). Cases await
review in lower courts in response to #RAWFORD )). See generally Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, No.
07-14664 (11th Cir. ﬁled Sept. 11, 2008) (order staying appeal pending resolution of #RAWFORD )));
Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. 08-17094 (9th Cir. ﬁled Sept. 24 2008).
163
See 6OTING 2IGHTS (EARING "EFORE 3 #OMM ON THE *UDICIARY, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement
of Pam S. Karlan) (arguing the Court continued its trend of rejecting facial challenges but left the
possibility of as-applied challenges).
164
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (describing facial and as-applied
challenges).
165
3EE #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1621–22 (discussing the heightened burden faced by the
petitioners in succeeding in their broad challenge to SEA 483’s constitutionality).
166

Hasen, supra note 144.
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evidence of disenfranchisement.167 #RAWFORD )) comports with the Roberts
Court’s trend of resisting facial challenges to statutes burdening fundamental
rights.168 The Court’s hostility to facial challenges is problematic because it
allows potentially unconstitutional laws to exist for some time before opponents
effectively challenge them as applied to speciﬁc situations.169 In the meantime,
voter-identiﬁcation laws may infringe upon fundamental voting rights, an effect
that is likely irreversible.170
Rather than resolving confusion about how lower federal courts should
evaluate voter-identiﬁcation laws, #RAWFORD )) compounded the confusion by
failing to provide an example of how to weigh competing electoral interests.171
Justice Stevens’ opinion turned largely on the facts surrounding SEA 483,
complicating attempts to articulate a general rule for evaluating future challenges
to voter-identiﬁcation laws.172 The failure of any rationale to command a majority

167

Id. (arguing the Court’s disfavor of facial challenges disadvantages burdened plaintiffs and
contradicts decisions like Harper, which outlawed poll taxes for everyone); cf. Harper, 383 U.S. at
668 (striking down a poll tax regardless of a citizen’s ability to pay it).
168

Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 530 (6th Cir. 2008) (suggesting #RAWFORD ))
continued the Roberts Court’s trend disfavoring facial challenges); David G. Savage, !BOUT &ACE !
4OOL OF THE #IVIL 2IGHTS -OVEMENT IS )NCREASINGLY 5NWELCOME IN THE (IGH #OURT, 94 A.B.A. J. 21 (2008)
(“In a series of rulings during the past two years, the court has rejected broad challenges to new
laws while at the same time leaving open the door to a more targeted attack on some of the laws’
provisions.”); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1183, 1191
(2008) (disfavoring facial challenges to election laws because they rely on speculation and interfere
with popularly elected branches of government).
169
Chemerinsky, supra note 113, at 441 (arguing #RAWFORD ))S preference for as-applied
challenges forces challengers to wait for an election law to disenfranchise voters before challenging
it); Tokaji, supra note 18 (arguing as-applied challenges focus on the end of the election process,
risking partisan court battles).
170

See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.

171

See Hasen, supra note 144 (noting the cursory nature of Justice Stevens’ opinion and the
difﬁculty it creates in predicting the outcomes of future voter-identiﬁcation litigation). Although
Justice Stevens’ opinion found insufﬁcient evidence to invalidate SEA 483 on facial grounds, it left
the door open for future as-applied challenges. See Chemerinsky, supra note 113, at 428 (arguing
#RAWFORD )) leaves open the possibility of as-applied challenges); Carrie Apfel, 4HE 0ITFALLS OF 6OTER
)DENTIlCATION ,AWS IN A 0OST Crawford World, AM. CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, at 1 (2008), available
at http://www.acslaw.org/ﬁles/Apfel%20Issue%20Brief.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (arguing
#RAWFORD )) invites as-applied challenges in the future). The Court suggests one type of evidence
capable of invalidating voter-identiﬁcation laws, but fails to explain what constitutes a severe burden
or how narrowly the state must draw its law to justify such a burden. 3EE #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct.
at 1623–24 (suggesting the unconstitutionality of voter-identiﬁcation laws without non-partisan
motivations). Unfortunately, few major empirical studies of in-person voter fraud exist. Overton,
supra note 73, at 665–66. As long as little hard data exists, courts may continue to apply the
balancing test in an ad hoc manner, leading to contrary results based on similar facts. Id.
Michael W. Hoskins, 6OTER )$ 1UESTIONS 2EMAIN !FTER 3#/453 2ULING, IND. LAWYER, May
14, 2008, at 13.
172
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of the Court also risks confusion in lower courts regarding how to apply it to
future election regulation challenges.173 The lack of a clear rule encourages future
litigation because the Court did not rule out future as-applied challenges, so
long as plaintiffs can present more evidence of disenfranchisement.174 In spite
of #RAWFORD ))S narrow holding, both advocates of voter-identiﬁcation laws, and
those who seek to challenge them, remain undeterred.175 Not only have several
states expressed interest in passing voter-identiﬁcation laws in the post-#RAWFORD
II world, but activists also retain hope that they may succeed in challenging such
laws.176

A Flexible Alternative
A better approach to voter-identiﬁcation cases would apply the "URDICK test in
a balanced fashion, adhering to its ﬂexibility.177 The Court should actually weigh
a statute’s burden on both individual and group voting rights against the realistic
threat of voter fraud.178 Since courts have no predetermined test for which standard
of review to use, the relative nature and magnitude of the two competing interests
should determine the proper level of scrutiny.179 In his dissent, Justice Breyer

173

Chemerinsky, supra note 113, at 428; see also Herrera, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82597, at *90
(noting confusion as to whether to apply Justice Stevens’ ﬂexible standard or the two-track standard
articulated in Justice Scalia’s concurrence); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (noting
federal courts’ contradictory interpretations of the plurality rationale in 2EGENTS OF THE 5NIVERSITY OF
#ALIFORNIA V "AKKE).
174
#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing the lack of clear standards
before elections encourages disruptive litigation).
175
Erwin Chemerinsky, ! 3EVERE 3ETBACK TO 6OTING 2IGHTS, TRIAL, July 1, 2008, at 64 (“This
rationale is an open invitation to state legislatures across the country to devise statutes that will
disenfranchise one party’s voters.”); Karen Brooks, 4EXAS 6OTER )$ $EBATE 2EVIVED *USTICES 3UPPORT
OF )NDIANA 0HOTO ,AW -EANS 0ROPONENTS )N ,EGISLATURE ,IKELY TO 4RY !GAIN, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 29, 2008, at 1A (“Now that the [United States] Supreme Court has cleared strong voteridentiﬁcation requirements. . . . Texas Republicans say there’s nothing to stop them from making it
the law here in 2009.”).
176

Hoskins, supra note 172, at 13.

177

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting).

178

Id.

179

Id. According to the dissent:
Under "URDICK, “the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,” upon an assessment of the “character and
magnitude of the asserted [threatened] injury,” and an estimate of the number of
voters likely to be affected.

Id. (quoting "URDICK, 504 U.S. at 434); see also Overton, supra note 73, at 667 (stating voteridentiﬁcation laws’ relative beneﬁts and burdens determine their permissible over and underinclusiveness).
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suggested how to apply a more balanced ﬂexible test.180 A severe burden on voting
rights and a weak threat of fraud justiﬁes heightened scrutiny.181 Less extreme
cases call for some form of intermediate scrutiny, requiring the state to show its
statute substantially relates to an important government interest.182 The degree of
narrow tailoring states must demonstrate changes based on the interests at hand
and the evidence supporting them.183 Even heightened scrutiny need not be “strict
in theory, fatal in fact,” as strong evidence of voter fraud may justify a properly
tailored voter-identiﬁcation law where a disproportionate risk of fraud exists.184

180
See #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (proposing the Court balance
voting interests and determine if the statute imposes burdens disproportionate to the interests
it serves). In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Breyer suggested a similar test in the Second
Amendment context, which could serve as a useful rule for evaluating voter-identiﬁcation laws:

[R]eview of gun-control regulation is not a context in which a court should effectively
presume either constitutionality (as in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality
(as in strict scrutiny). Rather, “where a law signiﬁcantly implicates competing
constitutionally protected interests in complex ways,” the Court generally asks
whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out
of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental
interests.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring)). This breaks from the rigid application of discrete
tiers of scrutiny, opting for more ﬂexibility when statutes implicate rights on both sides of the scale.
#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 2852–53 (Souter, J., dissenting).
181

See Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89 (holding a state must show a corresponding interest strong
enough to justify electoral regulations and narrowly tailor severe restrictions). Some lower federal
courts and a state court subjected voter-identiﬁcation laws to heightened scrutiny. Santillanes I, 506
F. Supp. 2d at 636; Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Billups I), 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1361, 1365–66
(N.D. Ga. 2006); Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211 (Mo. 2006).
182
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. (#RAWFORD )), 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Evans, J., dissenting) (suggesting the possibility of “strict scrutiny light”); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (requiring Virginia to show the Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of
women bore a substantial relationship to an important governmental objective); Flanders, supra note
156, at 151–52 (arguing state interests should not get a “free pass” by a plausible justiﬁcation for
maintaining electoral integrity and suggesting a court must determine how an interest necessitates
its burden); Schultz, supra note 1, at 531 (arguing courts should subject some non-severe burdens
to intermediate scrutiny).
183

See Santillanes I, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 628–29.
As the burden that an election law imposes . . . becomes more severe, the State’s
interest in imposing that burden must become more compelling, and the burden
the law imposes must become more narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Under
this approach, “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened
judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and
plausibility of the justiﬁcation raised.”

Id. (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391).
184
See Chemerinsky, supra note 175, at 64 (arguing a law like SEA 483 could meet strict
scrutiny if necessitated by a real risk of voter fraud).
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Courts should balance the nature and magnitude of a statute’s burden and not
arbitrarily tip the scale in favor of the state’s interest, as the Court did in #RAWFORD
II.185 The #RAWFORD )) Court erred in ﬁnding SEA 483 failed to severely burden
petitioners’ voting rights and in refusing to weigh those interests against the state
interest.186 Undue burden analysis does not require a statute to eliminate a right
before comparing it to the state’s interest.187 Courts should compare the speciﬁc
interests at hand, regardless of their initial determination of a statute’s severity.188
Even a seemingly minimal voting interest may invalidate a state regulation if the
state has no rational justiﬁcation for it.189 Actually weighing interests may reduce

185

See Schultz, supra note 1, at 526 (“[E]vidence must be offered to support the interest
to override a fundamental right.”); David Schultz, ,IES $AMN ,IES AND 6OTER )$S 4HE &RAUD OF
Voter Fraud 6 (2008), http://www.hlpronline.com/Schultz_HLPR.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2008)
(arguing "URDICK requires at least intermediate scrutiny and pointing to Santillanes I as an example
of how to take the ﬂexible standard seriously); Scott Ryan Nazzarine, Comment and Casenote,
! &ACELESS .AME IN THE #ROWD &REEDOM OF !SSOCIATION %QUAL 0ROTECTION AND $ISCRIMINATORY "ALLOT
!CCESS ,AWS, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 309, 347–56 (2003) (arguing, while not every voting regulation
deserves strict scrutiny, courts should apply a more balanced test, subjecting more severe restrictions
to heightened scrutiny).
186

#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562 (1964) (requiring meticulous examination of voting restrictions); Langholz, supra note
162, at 777–78 (stating "URDICK requires courts to assess the burden of a law and then compare it
to the state interest).
187
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (holding a statute unduly burdened reproductive right by
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions, in spite of not proscribing
abortions).
188
#RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (“Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position
to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.”); "UCKLEY, 424 U.S. at 48–49
(requiring the state to show empirical foundation for burdening a fundamental right); Brief of
Amici Curiae of the Brennan Center For Justice in Support of Petitioners, at 6–7, #RAWFORD )), 128
S. Ct. 1610 (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2007 WL 4102238 (arguing states must show more than a rational
basis for non-severe laws); Brief of Richard L. Hasen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at
4–5, #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. 1610 (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2007 WL 3353103 [hereinafter Hasen
Brief ] (arguing courts misconstrue "URDICK when they fail to engage in hard balancing of non-severe
statutes). Santillanes I explains such a comparison:

[T]he "URDICK test does not call for the Court to look for any conceivable, generalized
interest that might serve as a justiﬁcation for imposing a burden on the exercise of
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the context of elections. Rather, this test
calls for the City to put forward “the precise interests [which serve] as justiﬁcations
for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff ’s rights.”
Santillanes I, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (quoting "URDICK, 504 U.S. at 434).
189
Santillanes I, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 629 (explaining how bureaucratic burdens may impose
signiﬁcant obstacles on voting rights); see also McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of Elec., 65 F.3d 1215, 1221
n.6 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding even moderate regulations serving rational, but minor, interests, may
fail the sliding-scale test); Hasen Brief, supra note 188, at 4–5 (arguing states must reasonably tailor
election laws imposing non-severe burdens to their interests).
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uncertainty regarding how courts should determine the severity of an election
regulation.190

3UGGESTIONS FOR 0RACTITIONERS AND ,EGISLATORS
#RAWFORD )) suggests a few lessons for legal practitioners and legislators seeking
to design voter-identiﬁcation legislation. Although challengers face signiﬁcant
burdens in facially challenging photo-identiﬁcation requirements, challenges
to speciﬁc applications of such statutes may succeed.191 The Court’s lopsided
interpretation of "URDICK imposes substantial burdens on those challenging voteridentiﬁcation laws, but successful challenges remain possible.192 Challengers may
succeed in the difﬁcult task of unearthing quantitative evidence of voters ﬁnding
it difﬁcult to obtain documents necessary to receive identiﬁcation.193
State legislatures should take caution before passing voter-identiﬁcation laws
because such laws invite challenges even after #RAWFORD )), risking expensive court
battles and the possibility of unsatisfactory outcomes.194 Lawmakers should assess
190

Chris Elmendorf, *UDICIAL 2EVIEW OF %LECTORAL -ECHANICS, Election Law @ Moritz, May 6,
2008, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=417 (last visited Oct. 24,
2008) (arguing #RAWFORD )) avoided clarifying how courts should weigh competing voting interests);
Elmendorf, supra note 63, at 393 (arguing appellate courts should determine severity de novo,
clarifying what constitutes a severe burden for lower courts). But see Tokaji, supra note 148, at
389 (arguing the fact intensive nature of election cases makes de novo review not optimal). Prof.
Elmendorf draws a more systematic approach from Justices Breyer and Souter, suggesting courts
should look for danger signs of a substantial threat to the democratic process before applying
heightened scrutiny. Elmendorf, supra note 63, at 325; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 547 U.S. 230,
248–49 (2006) (independently evaluating a statute’s danger signs to determine its severity); Vieth
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 344 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (searching for clues of a statute’s
unfairness).
191

See supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text.

192

Hasen, supra note 144; Apfel, supra note 171, at 1. The few decisions applying #RAWFORD
II to non-voter-identiﬁcation election laws did so in a lopsided manner, applying less demanding
standards of review. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670 SBA, 2008 WL
4183981, *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (subjecting a California voting system for the disabled to
rational basis review because it imposed a minimal burden); Nader v. Cronin, Civ. No. 04-00611
ACK-LEK, 2008 WL 1932284, *11 (D. Haw. May 1, 2008) (holding Hawaii’s regulatory interests
justiﬁed stringent third party petition requirements).
193
3EE #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1621 (suggesting documentation justifying a voter-identiﬁcation
law challenge). The probability of successful challenges may increase as more data emerges during
the next few elections. Apfel, supra note 171, at 7. However, the Court may demonstrate the same
kind of skepticism expressed by the #RAWFORD )) Court towards disenfranchisement claims in future
cases. See Andrew M. Siegel, &ROM "AD TO 7ORSE 3OME %ARLY 3PECULATION !BOUT THE 2OBERTS #OURT
AND THE #ONSTITUTIONAL &ATE OF THE 0OOR, 59 S.C. L. REV. 851, 860–61 (2008) (describing the Court’s
skepticism during oral arguments that SEA 483 would block access to the franchise).
194

Apfel, supra note 171, at 9; Whitaker, supra note 17, at CRS-6; Hoskins, supra note 172, at
13 (predicting future litigation); Martin Frost, '/0 #RANKING 5P 3UPPRESSION %FFORTS, Politico.com,
May 27, 2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0508/10615.html (last visited November 15,
2008). The concurrence suggested as much when it warned Justice Stevens’ reliance on speciﬁc facts
risked “constant litigation.” #RAWFORD )), 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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whether voter fraud poses a realistic problem in their jurisdictions and carefully
determine if that risk outweighs the costs of protracted litigation and burdening
voting rights.195 States may avoid larger problems if they opt for alternative means of
addressing fraud, such as technological measures, increased enforcement of current
rules, and changes in electoral administration.196 Photographing registering voters
and matching their faces before allowing them to vote may achieve the purported
beneﬁts of voter-identiﬁcation legislation without burdening voting rights.197 For
the near future, states and litigants must navigate judicial uncertainty concerning
what constitutes a severe burden on voting rights.198

CONCLUSION
#RAWFORD )) will do little to end disputes over voter-identiﬁcation laws.199
Many state legislatures continue to pursue such laws and challengers think they
can succeed in attacking the application of such laws by making as-applied
challenges.200 The United States Supreme Court failed to articulate the method
to compare interests in future photo-identiﬁcation legislation.201 Justice Stevens’
opinion in #RAWFORD )), which constitutes the Court’s holding, failed to balance
Indiana’s interest requiring voter-identiﬁcation against the burden the law poses
to voting rights.202 The Court’s application of "URDICK suggests a lopsided test,
requiring concrete evidence from challengers to identiﬁcation laws and accepting
theoretical risks of fraud from states.203 #RAWFORD )) illustrates the Roberts Court’s

195

Apfel, supra note 171, at 9–10. Even if the abstract threat of voter fraud justiﬁed SEA 483,
the little evidence available suggests in-person voter fraud poses a minor threat to electoral integrity.
See David Callahan and Lori Minnite, SECURING THE VOTE: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTION FRAUD 7,
16–17 (2003), http://www.demos.org/pubs/EDR_-_Securing_the_Vote.pdf (last visited Oct. 24,
2008) [hereinafter Demos] (explaining the dearth of evidence of fraud by pointing to declining local
party power, stronger election administration, and new voting technology).
196

Demos, supra note 195, at 7; see also Richard Hasen, "EYOND THE -ARGIN OF ,ITIGATION
2EFORMING 53 %LECTION !DMINISTRATION TO !VOID %LECTORAL -ELTDOWN, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937,
969–70 (2005) (suggesting registration reform using biometric identiﬁcation).
197

Edward B. Foley, )S 4HERE A -IDDLE 'ROUND IN THE 6OTER )$ $EBATE, Ohio State
University: Election Law @ Moritz, Sept. 6, 2005, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
comments/2005/050906.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
198
See ,EADING #ASES—#ONSTITUTIONAL ,AW, 113 HARV. L. REV. 286, 293–94 (1999) (arguing
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsberg will never agree on the deﬁnition of
severity).
199

See supra notes 171–76 and accompanying text.

200

See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.

201

See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.

202

See supra notes 147–62 and accompanying text.
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resistance to facial challenges, suggesting future litigation will depend on the facts
of speciﬁc situations.204 As such, both litigators and legislators should take caution
in how they approach voter-identiﬁcation laws.205

204

See supra notes 163–70 and accompanying text.

205

See supra notes 191–98 and accompanying text.
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